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Abstract—In this paper we analyze power and frequency
allocation in wireless networks through potential games. Po-
tential games are used frequently in the literature for this
purpose due to their desirable properties, such as convergence
and stability. However, potential games usually assume massive
message passing to obtain the necessary neighbor information
at each user to achieve these properties. In this paper we show
an example of a game where we are able to characterize the
necessary neighbor information in order to show that the game
has a potential function and the properties of potential games.
We consider a network consisting of local access points where
the goal of each AP is to allocate power and frequency to
achieve some SINR requirement. We use the physical SINR
model to validate a successful allocation, and show that given
a suitable payoff function the game emits a generalized ordinal
potential function under the assumption of sufficient neighbor
information. Through simulations we evaluate the performance
of the proposed game on a large scale in relation to the amount
of information at each AP.
Index Terms—Radio resource mangament, dynamic spectrum
access, game theory, potential games.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the demand for wireless capacity increasing exponen-
tially, the concept of femtocells and other distributed networks
are seen as potential technologies to remedy this demand. With
these concepts comes the need to analyze and characterize
these distributed networks. Game theory is a popular tool
to investigate the behavior of autonomous agents as it is
capable of characterizing convergence criteria and stability of
different decision making policies. It has been used to analyze
distributed wireless networks as early as [1][2]. In most
examples of applying game theory to wireless networks the
problem statement is to optimize the network with regard to
some parameter, e.g. maximize sum-rate, proportional fairness
or average signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR), or
minimize network interference. If these optimization problems
satisfy some criteria (such as convexity) the overall optimiza-
tion problem can be decoupled into individual optimization
problems which can be solved individually by each user.
However, due to the nature of interference this is rarely the
case and the global optimization is usually non-convex and
NP-hard.
Instead of proposing complex algorithms based on KKT
conditions and second-order necessary conditions, one can
propose simpler algorithms based on simplified system models
[3] or even common sense [4] and use game theory to show
properties such as convergence and stability. As convergence,
stability and efficiency of steady-states depends on the chosen
payoff function, designing a suitable payoff function is the
most difficult part of modeling a system through game theory.
Often small tweaks are necessary to achieve the desired prop-
erties of the game, thus it is important to keep in mind what
the payoff function of the game reflects when investigating the
efficiency of a steady-state.
One class of games where it is clear what the payoff
function of each individual reflects when combined is potential
games. The class of potential games consists of games which
emits a potential function such that the increase or decrease in
payoff of each individual under best-response play is reflected
in a function. If this function reflects some overall system
performance, it is easy to see how the decisions made by
each individual affects the system as a whole. Potential games
where introduced in [5], where it was shown that this class
of games exhibits very desirable properties. This include the
existence of at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE),
convergence to a NE and Lyapunov stability of the NEs (when
the decision variable is continuous). Due to this, potential
games have been used for resource allocation in decentralized
wireless networks in [6][7][8][9]. In addition, potential games
in distributed networks is broadly covered in [10].
If one can find a potential function which reflects a desired
aspect of system performance, then best-response play by the
individuals will increase the system performance as well as
their own payoff. The drawback is that to achieve this property
each individual payoff has to embody the performance of the
other users in some way. This is usually achieved through
information exchange between users. The issue of limiting the
information exchange to only include a subset of nodes was
done in [11] under the protocol interference model. In this
model, interference from a transmitter is bounded in range
so that interference from transmitters which are more than a
threshold value away is neglected. However, in large scale
networks the accumulated interference from all interfering
transmitters can be much larger than that created by such a
subset.
In this paper we characterize the necessary number of
neighbors that each user needs to know the strategies of under
the physical SINR model [12]. Showing that such a subset
exists under this interference model enables a distributed
implementation, as global knowledge is not possible in a
distributed approach. Combined with a practical neighbor
discovery mechanism [13] we show results from simulations
based on the progress of neighbor discovery which validates
that given sufficient information our game will converge.
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Fig. 1. Three access points with a distance dij between them and coverage
area given by ri, i = 1, 2, 3.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
We investigate a system consisting of N wireless access
points (APs). We envision these APs operate over unlicensed
bands (either in the ISM bands or in the TV white spaces).
The set of APs considered is denoted N , where |N | = N .
To make our system model as generic as possible we
let each AP have its individual spectral resources. In some
systems, such as the ISM band, the spectral resources of
each AP is the same, while in other systems, such as white
space devices operating in the TV white spaces, the spectral
resources depend on location. We therefore let the channel
set available to each AP be a subset of the total channel set.
The set of channels available to AP i is denoted Ki, with
|Ki| = Ki. The total set of channels is denoted K, where
|K| = K, and we have that Ki ∈ K, ∀i ∈ N .
We assume each AP has a maximum power Pmaxi and a
quality of service requirement. In this paper this quality of
service metric is reflected through a SINR requirement βi for
each AP i. The SINR of AP i over channel k is given as
SINRi(k) =
gii(k)pi(k)
N0 + Ii(k)
(1)
where pi(k) is node i’s transmit power on channel k, N0 is
the power of the thermal noise and Ii(k) is the interference
observed at AP i over channel k and will be defined in the
next subsection. gii(k) is the channel gain from AP i to its
terminals. With multiple terminals, this can described as either
the average channel gain between AP i and its terminals, or
as a worst case channel gain between AP i and its terminals.
This channel gain between AP i and its terminals can be used
to approximate a coverage area for AP i with radius ri.
The goal of each AP is to select a channel such that its
SINR requirement, βi, is satisfied. This means that we find a
channel k∗ such that SINRi(k∗) ≥ βi. To achieve its SINR
requirement each AP is allowed to access one channel and
select a suitable power pi ≤ Pmaxi .
B. Interference Modeling
In distributed networks it is difficult to characterize the
interference between neighboring APs. Consider the simple
network depicted in Fig. 1. The distance between each AP
is given by dij = dji and each AP has a coverage radius
of ri, i = 1, 2, 3. The actual interference between the APs
depends on the transmission mode of each AP, i.e. whether
it is downlink or uplink transmission and also on the specific
location of each terminal associated with each AP.
In [14] an interference metric was proposed where the
amount of interference created by AP i to AP j in the downlink
was given as the average channel gain between AP i and AP
j’s terminals times AP i’s power in the downlink. If we assume
channel gain is a product of distance dependent path loss and
a stochastic variable, the average channel gain can written as
gˆij =
1
|Tj |
∑
l∈Tj
d−αil zil, (2)
where Tj is the set of AP j’s terminals, dil is the distance
between AP i and AP j’s terminal l, α is the path loss exponent
and zil is a stochastic variable which can be distributed
according to a fading distribution.
However, obtaining the necessary information from each
terminal to justify this metric is a difficult process which
assumes accurate sensing capabilities at the terminals and
frequent updates to include the stochastic variable. Instead,
we assume each AP has some sense of the average distance
between itself and its terminals so that it can compute an
estimate of its coverage area. The channel gain between AP i
and AP j then becomes
gij = (dij − rj)−αzij . (3)
We can simplify the channel gain further by the expectation
of the stochastic variable
g¯ij = (dij − rj)−αE[zij ] = (dij − rj)−αµz. (4)
A similar approach was done in [9] to model channel gain and
interference between APs and the validity of the model was
verified through simulations. Having defined the channel gain
between AP i and AP j, the total interference observed at AP
j on channel k is given as
Ij(k) =
∑
i∈N ,i6=j
gijpi(k). (5)
C. Potential Games
In game theory a game in normal form consists of a set of
players Ω = {1, ..., N}, where each player i has a strategy
space Si ∈ S and an associated payoff function which gives
each player a payoff ui(s) = ui(si, s−i) for a strategy profile
s = s1, ..., sN with s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2... [15]. We denote such
a game as
Γ = {N , S, {ui}}. (6)
In our game the players are the APs. APs and players are
used interchangeably in the rest of this paper. The strategies
of the players is the choice of the different available channels.
Thus the strategy profile s consists of allocated channels, e.g.
s = f1, f2, f1, f2 if the game consists of 4 players and player
one has chosen channel 1, player 2 has chosen channel 2,
3player 3 has chosen channel 1 and player 4 has chosen channel
2. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game is reached when no
player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its current
strategy. Thus, the strategy profile s∗ is a NE, if only if
∀i ∈ N , ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i),∀si ∈ Si\s∗i (7)
Let P : s→ R. We call P a potential function of the game
Γ [5]. Specifically, we have that an exact potential game is
characterized by , ∀i ∈ N , for si, s′i ∈ Si
ui(si, s−i)− ui(s′i, s−i) = P (si, s−i)− P (s′i, s−i) (8)
where P (s) = P (si, s−i) is the potential function. An ordinal
potential game is characterized by, ∀i ∈ Ω, for si, s′i ∈ Si
ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i)⇔ P (si, s−i) > P (s′i, s−i). (9)
Some important properties of potential games are summarized
below:
Proposition 1. (Corollary 2.2 [5]) Every finite ordinal poten-
tial game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2. (Lemma 2.3 [5]) Every finite ordinal potential
game has the finite improvement path (FIP).
Proposition 3. (Theorem 5.26 [10]) Given a potential game
Γ = {Ω, S, {ui}} with potential function P , global maximizers
of V are Nash equilibria.
Thus, potential games have at least one pure-strategy NE
which can be obtained through a best-response dynamic being
adopted by each player. One of these NEs are also maximizers
of the potential function. One down side is that if a game
consists of multiple NEs, it is difficult to characterize which
NE the game is converging to. In general this is dependent on
the initial conditions. One way to overcome this problem is
to try to design the payoff function such that only desirable
strategy profiles are NEs.
Although potential games have convergence due to the FIP
and existence of a NE, the better response dynamics between
players can not be arbitrary to achieve this convergence.
We define round-robin timing as players updating actions
according to a pre-determined order, random timing as one
player updating its action at a time, but the order is random,
asynchronous timing as a subset of players updating their
actions at a time and synchronous timing as all players updat-
ing their actions simultaneously. Then we have the following
property
Proposition 4. [10] A potential game converges under round-
robin, random and asynchronous timing. It does not converge
under synchronous timing.
In practice this is not a limitation as the probability of all
players choosing their action at the same time based on the
same information is almost zero when these plauers are not
synchronized.
III. POTENTIAL GAME FORMULATION
Due to the nature of interference maximizing the number
of APs achieving their SINR requirements is NP-hard. This
is easy to see as the problem is a non-convex (due to the
interference coupling between APs) integer problem (since
each AP can only select one channel). It is therefore unlikely
that there exists a non-trivial potential game formulation
where the potential function expresses the number of APs
achieving their SINR requirements (a trivial formulation would
be one involving global knowledge of all system parameters
at each AP). Thus, instead of designing a potential function
which maximizes the number of APs achieving their SINR
requirements we use a potential function which tries to find a
fair trade-off between the necessary transmit power at each AP
and the interference each AP generates to neighboring APs.
AP i’s necessary power to achieve its SINR requirement on
channel k is
pneci (k) ≥ min
(βi(N0 + Ii(k))
gii(k)
, Pmaxi
)
. (10)
Let the set Ri be the set of APs known by AP i, such that
AP i has an estimate of gij and which channel each AP in Ri
transmits on. The utility function we propose is the following
ui(k) =−
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
pj(k)gji(k)
−
∑
j 6=i,j∈Ri
pneci (k)g¯ij(k)l(pj(k)) (11)
where l(pj(k)) = 1 if pj(k) > 0 and 0 otherwise. The first
summation is the interference observed at AP i and the second
summation is the interference generated by AP i at AP i’s
known neighbors. We assume that the interference level can
be measured and thus AP i does not have to calculate the
accumulated interference in each channel based on knowledge
of the other transmitters. The measurement can either be done
by the AP and the power of interference can be amplified to
reflect the interference level at the edge of the coverage area,
or the terminals can do measurements and report to the AP
these measurements after which the AP calculates an average
interference level for each channel.
The transmit channel k∗ is then selected as
k∗ = max
k∈K
ui(k) (12)
and the power is set as
pi(k) =
{
pneci (k) k = k
∗
0 otherwise (13)
A. Small Network
Assume each AP i knows the path loss between its self and
all other APs in the network such that Ri = N for all i. Then
it was shown in [8] that
P (s) =
∑
i∈N
(− 1
2
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
pj(k)gji(k)
− 1
2
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
pneci (k)g¯ij(k)l(pj(k))
)
(14)
is an exact potential function for the game with utility (11).
4B. Large-scale Network
In practice it is not possible to know how ones own trans-
mission will affect all other APs in the network. Instead we try
characterize the necessary neighbor APs AP i needs to obtain
information about to preserve the game as a potential game.
We see from (11) that an increase in ui due to power control
can only occur when the transmit power at i is decreased.
Clearly this decrease of power at i cannot decrease uj ∀j 6= i.
An increase in ui due to channel selection can occur in
three ways:
1) increase due to the first sum in (11): can change frequency
to a channel with less interference, which leads to a
decrease in power, which is in general good. However,
this can increase the interference at some near-by APs.
2) increase due to the second sum in (11): can change
frequency to a channel which generates less interference.
Good for near-by neighbors, but can result in an increase
in power which can affect far-away APs.
3) both sums are decreased: this is generally beneficial.
We see that an increase in ui can have various effects, except
in the case where both sums are decreased.
Let Ni be the set of neighbor APs closest to AP i such that
all channels are at least utilized by one AP in Ni. Then we
have the following result.
Proposition 5. The game formed by the utility function ui(k)
converges if for all i Ni ⊆ Ri.
Proof: See Appendix A.
C. Scenarios where Selfish Converges
The proposed utility function that each player wants to
maximize is a trade-off between the interference observed by
that player and the interference the player will create for the
other players. A selfish approach would be to only choose
a channel based on the interference observed by the player.
However, analysis have shown that this approach does not
converge in general [9] and that the NEs reached by such
selfish approach can be very inefficient [16].
For our system model, there are cases where selfish behavior
do converge.
Proposition 6. Assume that each AP have the same coverage
area, so that ri = r, ∀i ∈ N . Then a selfish best response
dynamic by each player converges to a NE.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Both Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 proves convergence
by showing that the games are generalized ordinal potential
games. We can simplify the scenario of Proposition 6 to the
case where there is no power control and every AP transmits
at the same maximum power P . In this case the game is a
exact potential game.
Proposition 7. Assume each AP transmits at the same transmit
power P and that there is no power control. Further assume
that each AP have the same coverage area, so that ri = r
∀i ∈ N . Then a selfish best response dynamic by each player
converges to a NE.
Proof: With no power control and the same coverage
radius for all APs the interference created by AP i to AP
j is the same as interference created by AP j to AP i. Thus
gij = gji and Iij = Iji. Thus the accumulated interference
observed at AP i is the same as the amount of interference
AP i will create at the other APs, and therefore the channel
which has the least interference at AP i is also the channel
that will generate the least amount of interference at the other
APs. In this case, selfish behavior forms an exact potential
game which converges.
D. Local Optimality
From Proposition 7 we saw that if there is no power control
and all APs have the same coverage area the channel with
least interference at AP i is also the channel on which AP i
will generate the least interference. Consider the general case,
with power control and different coverage areas, if the channel
with least interference at AP i is also the channel on which
AP i will generate the least interference, how ”optimal” is this
choice of channel from a system performance perspective?
Proposition 8. If the selected transmit power at an AP is the
channel with both the least amount of observed interference
at that AP and channel which will generate the least amount
of interference to the other APs, this is the optimal choice for
the AP without global knowledge.
Proof: Since the channel with least interference is the
channel that requires least transmit power, this channel will
lead to the least amount of generated interference from an AP
to the rest of the set of APs if this channel also minimizes∑
j 6=i,j∈N gij l(pj(k)). Thus if AP i should be allowed to
transmit, this would be the channel to select. However, from
a system performance perspective, where the goal is to max-
imize the number of APs achieving their SINR requirement,
there could be a case where the AP should choose a different
channel. For instance, from a centralized view, the selection of
the channel with least interference and generated interference
can lead another AP to not achieve its SINR requirement,
if this AP is operating at the limit of maximum transmit
power and interference it can tolerate, whereas choosing a
non-optimal channel (which does not maximize (11) would
not do this. However, for AP to be able to determine this
would require global information.
IV. A PEER-TO-PEER DISCOVERY MECHANISM FOR
LARGE-SCALE NETWORKS
How neighbors are discovered and how the information
is exchanged does not matter for the resource allocation
schemes presented in the two previous sections, as long as
the information is obtained in some way. In this section we
briefly describe a peer-to-peer discovery mechanism suited for
neighbor discovery and information exchange that we have
used in the simulation results [13].
The discovery mechanism consists of two parts: the first
mechanism provides a random sample of all APs participating
in the network. The second mechanism selects the most impor-
tant APs from the random sample and exchanges information
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Fig. 2. Average time to reach stable state for varying neighbor node density
in random topologies with standard deviation.
TABLE I
EVALUATION PARAMETERS FOR THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
ALGORITHM.
Parameter Value
Number of Channels (|K|) 13
Maximum transmit power 100 mW
SINR requirement ∼ U(1, 6)
Thermal noise power 10−8 W
Path loss between node i and j, gi,j d(i, j)−3 × zij
Number of APs considered 305
Maximum coverage radius (dtransmit) 20,40 m
Maximum number of iterations 50
with them. As described in Section II, each AP has a coverage
radius. We now assume that an AP has a coordination range,
which is used to determine the importance of neighboring
APs. Important neighboring APs are then determined by the
extent to which the coordination areas overlap. When two
nodes have overlapping coordination areas, they are defined
as candidate nodes to each other. Note that this is just a
rough estimate of whether two APs will interfere with each
other. The medium that convey the messages of the discovery
mechanism is not specified in [13]. However, assuming the
transmitters are access points or other terminals that provide
Internet connectivity, one option is that the peer-to-peer net-
work operate over the Internet. When a node connects to the
P2P network, it begins to sample the network randomly. As
it obtains knowledge about other nodes in the network, it
exchanges information with these nodes while still sampling
the network randomly. As time progresses, more and more
candidate nodes are discovered until all APs know about
their candidate nodes. Fig. 2 shows the average time it takes
all APs to discover all their candidate nodes with standard
deviation for increasing network sizes (or increasing number
of neighbors). Although it may take some time to converge,
convergence is guaranteed given enough time.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
To evaluate the resource allocation algorithm we have
simulated a topology of APs based on the municipality of
Tynset in Norway. We use household locations as the basis for
AP location. We consider an area of 1× 1 km which consists
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Fig. 3. Number of satisfied APs as a function of time in Tynset with
maximum coverage radius of 20 meters.
of 305 APs. We set |K| = 13 to mimic the number of available
channels in 802.11b/g/n. Unlike Wi-Fi, we assume all channels
are orthogonal. Each AP has a maximum transmit power of
100 mW, which is the maximum EIRP for Wi-Fi in Europe.
It is also defined as the maximum transmit power for mobile
white space devices in the US [17]. The signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for each AP is uniformly
distributed between 1 and 10. The coverage area of each AP is
uniformly distributed between 3 and dtransmit, where dtransmit is
either 25 or 50. The coordination range used by the discovery
mechanism is set to two times the maximum coverage radius.
Thermal noise power is set to 10−8. The path loss between a
transmitter i and receiver j, gij(k), is given in our simulations
as gi,j = d(i, j)−3× zij , where zij is distributed according to
a log-normal distribution with 0 dB mean and 8 dB standard
deviation. The simulation parameters are summarized in Table
I. Note that even though we have included shadowing in
the simulations, knowledge of the shadowing gain between
between AP i and AP j is assumed unknown in the estimation
of the last sum in (11). Finally, an AP is defined as satisfied
if its SINR at its coverage edge satisfies the SINR target.
We evaluate the resource allocation algorithm in light of
both its quality as a resource allocation algorithm and how
it progresses based on neighbor discovery from the discovery
mechanism in Section IV. As very little information is known
at the start-up of a network, the resource allocation algorithm
can not make correct decisions. However, as time progresses,
the discovery mechanism discovers more and more neighbors
and the performance of the proposed resource allocation
algorithm increases. For all plots, the results are plotted against
time as the discovery protocol finds more candidate nodes
(relevant neighboring APs). Once a candidate node is found,
the candidate node exchanges location knowledge along with
its estimated coverage radius. It will also continuously send
information about its current transmit channel.
The resource allocation algorithm is compared to two simple
allocation schemes and centralized solution. The two alloca-
tion schemes are random and selfish.The random allocation
scheme selects a frequency randomly from the set of available
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Fig. 4. Number of iterations until convergence against time in Tynset with
maximum coverage radius of 20 meters
channels. The selfish scheme selects the channel with least
interference and transmits with a power just large enough to
achieve its SINR requirement. Both our proposed algorithm
and the selfish algorithm starts with a random allocation of
channels.
As finding the maximum number of users that achieve their
SINR is NP-hard, comparing our algorithm to an optimal
solution is not possible. However, in [18] a simple sufficient
condition is shown to exists for which an efficient heuristic
algorithm can find the solution. Thus, the solution value from
this heuristic algorithm gives a lower bound on the number of
APs that can theoretically achieve their SINR simultaneously.
The drawback with this approach is that it assumes global
knowledge of all system parameters and requires APs not
achieving their SINR to power off.
B. Simulation Results
In Fig. 3, the number of satisfied APs is given in Tynset with
a maximum coverage radius of 20 meters. As expected, the
random allocation and selfish scheme behave the same over
time, as their performance is not related to neighbor discovery.
The same holds for the centralized solution. For our algorithm
we see a clear increase in the number of satisfied APs between
50 to 100 seconds. The increase has two dependent causes: 1)
From 50 to 100 seconds the discovery mechanism goes from
a state where very few APs know all their neighbors to a state
where most APs know all their neighbors, as seen in Fig. 4. 2)
From Fig. 4 we also see that our algorithm goes from a high
average of 47 to 38 iterations. The average of 47 is close to the
maximum number of iterations (50) we set for the algorithm
and is due to the algorithm not being able to converge when
too little information is available about neighbors. When more
information becomes available the algorithm converges in less
than 50 iterations for most instances and the average goes
down. Note that as some APs are without neighbors there are
fewer nodes with missing neighbors than the total number of
APs in Fig. 4.
In essence, this shows that in order for our algorithm to
perform well, the algorithm must converge. For our algorithm
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Fig. 5. Number of satisfied APs as a function of time in Tynset with
maximum coverage radius of 40 m.
to converge, we have to know a sufficiently amount of neigh-
bors such that at least one neighbor utilizes each channel (by
Proposition 5). This seems to occur at about 100 seconds.
The importance of convergence is further emphasized in
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 where the maximum coordination range is
increased to 80 meters and the maximum coverage radius is 40
meters. As some APs do not have candidate APs, the number
of initial APs with missing candidate APs is also here lower
than the total number of APs. Our algorithm starts off with
performance similar to the selfish approach. At 50 seconds the
performance drops below the selfish selection scheme, before
it starts to improve and settles at around 150 seconds. The
convergence plot in Fig. 6 is similar to Fig. 4 and we can again
conclude that the algorithm performs well when the algorithm
is able to converge.
The drop in performance from 50 to 70 seconds can be
explained as follows: from 50 to 70 seconds some APs find
some of their relevant neighboring APs. However, due to the
large coverage radius, and thus large coordination radius, some
of these candidate nodes can be far away, while other more
important candidate nodes are not found. Thus the utility
function (11) takes the well-being of far away neighbors into
account, but not the ones close by. This drop in performance
did not occur in Fig. 3, due to the small coordination radius.
In Fig. 3 our algorithm performed better than the central-
ized solution. As the centralized solution is obtained from a
sufficient condition on optimality it is not an upper bound
and can surpassed. However, in Fig. 5 our algorithm does not
surpass the centralized solution, but comes close as discovery
mechanism discovers more neighbors. An explanation for why
algorithm does not achieve the same or better as the sufficient
condition is that in this scenario a lot fewer APs can achieve
their SINR requirements, since the maximum coverage radius
is increased from 20 to 40 m. To achieve the global optimum
in this case some APs must turn of their power in order for
APs to achieve their SINR targets. As our approach does not
provide any access control all APs are allowed to transmit
and the therefore the global optimum cannot be achieved by
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Fig. 6. Number of iterations until convergence against time in Tynset with
maximum coverage radius of 40 m.
our algorithm in this case. An important aspect of distributed
resource allocation schemes in large scale networks is the
domino effect [19], which is the change in the network due
to a change in resource allocation at one or more APs. It is
desirable that this effect is as small as possible, i.e. as few
APs as possible should have to update their allocation due to
a change at another AP. In general, changing power levels at
a transmitter only leads to a minor domino effect as a large
change in one node affects the other nodes in a much smaller
scale as the path loss exponent is larger than 2. Predicting the
effect of frequency change is more difficult.
To investigate this effect we let our original network con-
verge (220 seconds in Fig. 7) and then insert 10 APs in our 1
x 1 km area (230 seconds in Fig. 7). We measure the change
over time as the number of APs that change their frequency
from one time interval to the next. From Fig. 7 we see that
approximately one third of the APs change their frequency at
the time the new APs are inserted into the network. After this
point only 2-3 APs change their frequency for each 10 second
interval until after 290 seconds where 13 APs change their
frequency. After this, the change goes down to just above 0. An
interesting observation is that when the 13 APs change their
frequency at 290 seconds, the number of satisfied APs also
increases. It seems that this change occurs from the discovery
of new near-by neighbors both by new and old APs. When
these APs adjust their frequency assignments the number of
satisfied APs increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated power and frequency allocation
in a large-scale wireless network through potential games. As
potential games have desirable properties such as pure strategy
Nash equilibria and guaranteed convergence. For these reasons
potential games have been used to analyze wireless networks
in the past. Our main result is the characterization of the
necessary amount of information each AP needs about its
neighbors in order to conserve the potential game property
of our proposed game. We have also shown that in certain
cases the best response dynamic of each AP according to
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Fig. 7. Satisfied APs and number of APs changing frequency as a function
of time. 10 additional APs are added to a converged network at 230 seconds.
the proposed game is the optimal strategy of each AP, in
the absence of global information at each AP. To obtain the
necessary information we used a P2P discovery mechanism
proposed in a previous paper. Through simulations we showed
that the game performs better than current best-practice in such
large scale networks with regard to performance, convergence
and robustness, but this performance is dependent on neighbor
information as suggested by our analytical analysis.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
We prove convergence by showing that the game forms
a generalized ordinal potential game. Convergence is then
guaranteed as all finite generalized ordinal potential games
have a pure strategy equilibrium [5, Corollary 2.2] and all finite
generalized ordinal potential games have a finite improvement
path [5, Lemma 2.3].
A game with utility function ui constitutes an ordinal
potential game if there exists a potential function such that
ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i)⇒ P (si, s−i) > P (s′i, s−i).
From the definition of Ni we can rewrite the utility function
as
ui(k) =−
∑
j 6=i,j∈Ni
pj(k)gji(k)−
∑
j 6=i,j∈N\Ni
pj(k)gji(k)
−
∑
j 6=i,j∈Ri
pneci (k)gij(k)f(pj(k)). (15)
where the first term is the observed interference at AP i
due to known neighboring APs of i, the second term is
interference due to non-neighboring APs of i, and the third
term is interference generated by i to its known neighboring
APs.
Since power control already satisfies the ordinal potential
game condition, we only consider frequency selection. We also
assume |N | >> |Ni|, so that a decrease in power at i results in
an increase in the sum of utility functions over all j ∈ N\Ni.
Consider first a decrease in ui due to an increase in the first
or last sum of (15). Then we can set the second sum constant,
8and the game emits an exact potential function as in the case
where all APs are known. Thus, the interesting case is when
there is a decrease due to an increase in the second sum.
To show this part we investigate the utility functions of all
j ∈ Ni as a result of a change in ui. Let l ∈ Ni be the APs
which transmit on the same channel as i before i changes
channel. Then
ul∈Ni(si) = −pigil − Cl − plgli (16)
where Cl is some constant which will not change due to i
changing its frequency. Similarly we denote p ∈ Ni as the
APs which transmit on the same channel as i after i changes
channel.
up∈Ni(si) = Cp (17)
Finally we have that ui(si) is given as
ui(si) = −
∑
l∈Ni
pjgji − Ii −
∑
l∈Ni
pigij (18)
where Ii is the term due to all j ∈ N\Ni. Now assume that if
i changes its strategy from si to s′i that the term Ii decreases
by . I.e. I ′i = Ii − . By such a decrease in interference at i,
i can decrease its power if it changes its strategy to s′i. The
fractional decrease is, neglecting thermal noise,
p′i =
∑
l∈Ni plgli + Ii − ∑
l ∈ Niplgli + Ii pi (19)
The new utilities then become
ul∈Ni(s
′
i) = Cl (20)
ui(s
′
i) =
∑
p∈Ni
ppgpi − Ii + 
−
∑
p∈Ni
∑
l∈Ni plgli + Ii − ∑
l∈Ni plgli + Ii
pigip (21)
up∈Ni(s
′
i) = −
∑
l∈Ni plgli + Ii − ∑
l∈Ni plgli + Ii
pigip − Cp − ppgpi
(22)
By summation of all utilities before and after we get
P (si) = −2
∑
l∈Ni
pigij−2
∑
l∈Ni
plgli−
∑
l∈Ni
Cl−
∑
p∈Ni
Cp−Ii
(23)
P (s′i) = −2
∑
p∈Ni
ppgpi − 2
∑
p∈Ni
pigip
+ 2
∑
p∈Ni
pigip∑
l∈Ni pjgji + Ii
−
∑
l∈Ni
Cl
−
∑
p∈Ni
Cp − Ii +  (24)
To verify the ordinal potential function we must show that
ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i)⇒ P (si, s−i) > P (s′i, s−i).
−
∑
l∈Ni
pjgji−Ii −
∑
l∈Ni
pigil > −
∑
p∈Ni
ppgpi − Ii + −∑
p∈Ni
pigip + 
∑
p∈Ni
pigip∑
l∈Ni pjgji + Ii
(25)
By multiplying each side by 2 and we see that P (si) > P (s′i).
We see that for this analysis to hold, AP i must have the
knowledge of at least one neighboring AP that utilizes each
channel. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
When all APs have the same radius the channel gain be-
tween them is also equal (i.e. gij = gji). By prove convergence
by same argument as in the proof of Proposition 5, by showing
that there exists a utility function which emits a potential
function such that the game forms a generalized potential
game.
Without any neighbor information, the selfish utility func-
tion is given as
ui(k) =
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k) (26)
Clearly minimizing Ui(k) is equivalent to minimizing the
following, slightly altered utility function
u′i(k) =
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k)P
nec
i (k). (27)
Consider a potential function P (A) defined for an allocation
A as
P (s) =
N∑
i=1
Ki∑
k=1
u′i(k) (28)
Now, AP i will change its allocation from channel k to k′
given that
ui(k
′) =
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k
′) <
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k) = ui(k) (29)
By multiplying each side by Pi we have
u′i(k
′) =
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k
′)P neci (k
′) <
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k)P
nec
i (k) = u
′
i(k)
Assume before AP i changed from k to k′ that AP l transmits
on k and AP m transmits on k′. Since AP i no longer transmits
on k, clearly ul(k) (after) < ul(k) (before). Define ∆ui, ∆ul
and ∆um as
∆u′i = u
′
i(k)− u′i(k′)
=
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k)P
nec
i (k)−
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k
′)P neci (k
′) > 0,
∆ul = ul(before i changed)− ul(after i changed)
= gilPl(k)P
nec
i (k)
and
∆um = um(before i changed)− um(after i changed)
= −gimPm(k)P neci (k)
∆ul corresponds to the users that have gained by user i’s
change from channel k to k′ in terms of increased SINR. ∆um
corresponds to the users that have lost by user i’s change from
9channel k to k′ in terms of decreased SINR. The total change
over all affected users is thus
∆P (s, s′) = ∆ui +
∑
l 6=i
∆ul +
∑
m6=i
∆um
=
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k)P
nec
i (k)−
∑
j 6=i
gjiPj(k
′)P neci (k
′)
+
∑
j 6=i
gijPj(k)P
nec
i (k)−
∑
j 6=i
gijPj(k
′)P neci (k
′)
=(a) 2
(∑
j 6=i
akj gjiPjPi −
∑
j 6=i
ak
′
j gjiPjPi
)
> 0 (30)
where the equality (a) holds as long as gij = gji. Thus if
ui(k) > ui(k
′)⇒ P (s) > P (s′) and this is thus a generalized
ordinal potential game. 
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